Clausewitz insisted on aggressively following up after concentrating force at the decisive point. Any strategy that doesn’t account for how to exploit victory is incomplete, inadequate. “What remains true under all imaginable conditions,” he wrote, “is that no victory will be effective without pursuit; and no matter how brief the exploitation of victory, it must always go further than an immediate follow-up.

I was also told that a brand-new CEO shouldn’t be trying to make huge acquisitions. I was “crazy,” as one of our investment bankers put it, because the numbers would never work out and this was an impossible “sale” to the street.

The banker had a point. It’s true that on paper the deal didn’t make obvious sense. But I felt certain that this level of ingenuity was worth more than any of us understood or could calculate at the time. It’s perhaps not the most responsible advice in a book like this to say that leaders should just go out there and trust their gut, because it might be interpreted as endorsing impulsivity over thoughtfulness, gambling rather than careful study. As with everything, the key is awareness, taking it all in and weighing every factor—your own motivations, what the people you trust are saying, what careful study and analysis tell you, and then what analysis can’t tell you. You carefully consider all of these factors, understanding that no two circumstances are alike, and then, if you’re in charge, it still ultimately comes down to instinct. Is this right or isn’t it? Nothing is a sure thing, but you need at the very least to be willing to take big risks. You can’t have big wins without them.

Intelligence Wins Wars

Perhaps the most difficult part of good strategy is hard-nosed competitive analysis. Almost every institution develops a pride in itself; it wants to believe it’s the best…

But facts are facts, and they’ve got to be assembled on a continuous, unbiased basis. Products have to be torn down and examined for cost, features, and functionality. Each element of the income statement and balance sheet has to be examined with total objectivity vis-à-vis competitors. What are their distribution costs? How many salespeople do they have? How are their salespeople paid? What do distributors think about them v. us? There are hundreds of questions that need analytical examination and which then must be pulled together in comprehensive, deep competitive assessments.

I am reminded that good strategies are usually “corner solutions.” That is, they emphasize focus over compromise. They focus on one aspect of the situation, not trying to be all things to all people.

In 1944 the US Office for Strategic Services (the precursor of the CIA) produced a ‘sabotage manual’ to advise people in occupied European states on how to obstruct the conduct of the war with little personal risk. Suggestions included:

• Insist on doing everything through ‘channels’. Never permit short-cuts to be taken in order to expedite decisions.

• Make ‘speeches’. Talk as frequently as possible, and at great length. Illustrate your ‘points’ by long anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences.

• When possible, refer all matters to committees, for ‘further study and consideration’. Attempt to make the committee as large as possible – never less than five.

• Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible.

• Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions.

• Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to re-open the question of the advisability of that decision.

• Advocate ‘caution’. Be ‘reasonable’ and urge your fellow-conferees to be ‘reasonable’ and avoid haste which might result in embarrassments or difficulties later on.

Many readers, especially academic ones, will be able to testify to the continuing effectiveness of these techniques even in peacetime.