Over time, centralized control creates profound distortionsā unbalanced sectoral growth (typically favoring capital-intensive industries), bloated state enterprises, chronic under- or overcapacity, and epic waste. Chinaās state-owned enterprises, for example, generate about 20 percent of Chinese output, but account for more than three-quarters of all corporate borrowing.
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These companies were built, or in some cases rebuilt, with one goal in mindāto maximize human contribution. This aspiration is the animating spirit of humanocracy, and stands in stark contrast to the bureaucratic obsession with control. Both goals are important, but in most organizations, the effort spent on ensuring conformance is a vast multiple of the energy devoted to enlarging the capacity for human impact. This gross imbalance is dangerous for organizations, a drag on the economy, and ethically troubling.
As China emulated Americaās past successes, the US government got busy undermining its own strengths. A procedure-obsessed left conspired with a thoughtlessly destructive right to constrain the government. Neither the left nor the right allows the state to deliver essential goods expected by the public. The Biden administration may have ushered through historic bills on industrial policy, but executive agencies were so obsessed with procedural concerns that little building actually took place before voters reelected Donald Trump, who has threatened to cancel many of these projects. The United States is still a superpower that is able to outclass China on many dimensions. But it is also in the grips of an ineffectual state where people are increasingly concerned with safeguarding a comfortable way of life.
The Communist Party has relentlessly broken up entrenched interests, partly to prevent rich people from gaining political power and partly to spread material benefits throughout the country. Itās rise suggests that a country can grow powerful when it trains a lot of engineers and puts them to work, even under less-than-great institutional arrangements. In the words of one 1991 paper written by a trio of economists, āOur evidence shows that countries with a higher proportion of engineering college majors grow faster; whereas countries with a higher proportion of law concentrators grow more slowly.ā Engineers are part of the reason that China has grown so much wealthier, despite its wavering commitment to secure property rights.
Never mind that China has gotten less growth from each unit of new investment since its big infrastructure binge of 2008. The Communist Party continues to build because itās full of engineers and also because Marxist-Leninists donāt want to cede economic agency to the people.
China would be better off if it built less and built better. But we should also resist judging it by the standards of the United States, which is frankly underprovisioned in public infrastructure. Because there is perhaps one thing worse than an overactive state that canāt stop movingā and that is a state that canāt move at all.
Xi has forcefully reminded Chinaās tech companies that they cannot represent a power center that challenges the stateās sovereignty. It was, in other words, an attempt to change the cultural mindset of companies. The Communist Party reminded them that it retains the discretionary power to engineer all aspects of society, which means putting tech companies in their place.
There might be something to be said for this sort of approach. What if, say, the US government had responded to the 2008 financial crisis by reshaping Wall Streetās risk management culture rather than engaging in the endless negotiations that yielded a 2,300-page statute that nobody understands? But Xiās attempt to achieve cultural change has left people disgruntled and whole industries disfigured.
The trouble with Xi Jinping is that he is perhaps 60 percent correct on everything. Heās driving toward a usually admirable long-term goal. But in the name of achieving change, the engineering state delivers such beatings on people or industries that they are unable to pick themselves back up again. Even if Xiās judgments are right, his brute-force solutions reliably worsen things. Does big tech have too much power? Fine, but stomping out their businesses has traumatized entrepreneurs. Are housing developers taking on too much debt? Yes, but driving many of them toward default subsequently triggered a collapse in homebuyer confidence, prolonging a property slump. Does the government need to rein in corruption? Definitely, but Xi has terrorized the bureaucracy to the point of paralysis.