Rather than deskilling work, we need to upskill employees. Rather than outsourcing low-value jobs, we need to increase the creative content of every role. Instead of assuming that middle-class jobs must ultimately fall to globalization and automation, we need to redesign work environments so they elicit the everyday genius of every human being.

The goal, of course, is not to throw 23 million people out of work, but to refocus their talents on productive activities. If each of these individuals contributed $148,000 to the economy, rather than zero, GDP would increase by roughly $3.4 trillion. That gain, if achieved in equal increments over the next ten years, would add nearly 1.6 percent to annual productivity growth, which would more than double the 1.3 percent rate turned in between 2007 and 2018. Achieving similar gains across the OECD would add $10 trillion to global output.

The fact that the Roman economy was sustained by what were, from the point of view of most citizens, intelligent working machines posed some similar economic challenges to those posed by large-scale automation. One of these was wealth inequality.

Thus, while those who are very wealthy like to believe that they are worthy of the financial rewards they have accrued, many poorer people don’t want to mess with the dream that they too might achieve such riches if only they work hard enough. For them to concede that perhaps the system was stacked against them—that money had become far better at begetting more money than working long hard shifts—would be tantamount to abandoning their sense of agency and their cherished beliefs that what made their countries different was that anyone who worked hard enough could be whatever they wished to be.

Where history is a better guide to the future is on the nature of change. It reminds us that we are a stubborn species: one that is deeply resistant to making profound changes in our behavior and habits, even when it is clear that we need to do so. But it also reveals that when change is forced upon us we are astonishingly versatile. We are able to quickly adapt to new, often very different ways of doing and thinking about things and in a short time become as habituated to them as we were to those that preceded them. This being so, while automation and AI have made it possible for us to embrace a profoundly different future, it is unlikely that it will be the catalyst that causes the dramatic changes in “social customs and economic practices” that Keynes envisaged. Far more likely catalysts take the form of a rapidly changing climate, like that which spurred the invention of agriculture; anger ignited by systematic inequalities like those that stirred the Russian revolution; or perhaps even a viral pandemic that exposes the obsolescence of our economic institutions and working culture, causing us to ask what jobs are truly valuable and question why we are content to let our markets reward those in often pointless or parasitic roles so much more than those we recognize as essential.