Now, I must tell you, I am not sure that in 1993 I or anyone else would have started out to create an IBM. But, given IBM’s scale and broad-based capabilities, and the trajectories of the information technology industry, it would have been insane to destroy its unique competitive advantage and turn IBM into a group of individual component suppliers—more minnows in an ocean.

However, what was also clear was that IBM was paralyzed, unable to act on any predictions, and there were no easy solutions to its problems. The IBM organization, so full of brilliant, insightful people, would have loved to receive a bold recipe for success—the more sophisticated, the more complicated the recipe, the better everyone would have liked it.

It wasn’t going to work that way. The real issue was going out and making things happen every day in the marketplace.

Opening up our stack (and our minds) to others had many positive effects on IBM. It cut our losses and improved our integrated offerings to customers. And it freed up resources to invest in the future. Huge sums of money and huge quantities of brainpower have been redeployed from wall-banging futility to exciting new work in areas such as storage systems, self-directing computers, bioinformatics, and nanotechnology.

Many IT companies that have built their businesses on some proprietary product have tried to leap across that chasm. Few have made it across successfully.

I can understand the joke that was going around IBM in the early 1990s: “Products aren’t launched at IBM. They escape.