Most great companies are formed to meet the goals and express the values of their founders, which is not always the same as maximizing shareholder wealth. For them, profit is simply a strategic necessity rather than the supreme end point.

This may be a jolting concept, we realize. But we’re certainly not the only management writers who have come to the same conclusion. Peter F. Drucker, in his classic text, Management: Task, Responsibilities, Practices, reached the same conclusion years ago:

Business cannot be defined or explained in terms of profit... The concept of profit maximization is, in fact, meaningless... The first test of any business is not the maximization of profit, but the achievement of sufficient profit to cover the risks of economic activity.

1. Obliquity

Visionary companies pursue a cluster of objectives, of which making money is only one— and not necessarily the primary one. Yes, they seek profits, but they’re equally guided by a core ideology— core values and sense of purpose beyond just making money. Yet paradoxically, the visionary companies make more money than the purely profit driven companies.

— Jim Collins and Jerry Porras, Built to Last

Disruptive technologies, Christensen had observed, often grew out of hobbyist communities. They were developed using “bootlegged resources” in which “off-the-shelf components” were redeployed for something other than their intended purpose. They started out wonky but rapidly improved along attributes of performance that established players ignored.

But even once you had absorbed this lesson, it wasn’t easy to implement. Pursuing niche markets cost profits, making investors question your sanity. This, too, Christensen had foretold: “One of the reasons managers at established firms find it difficult to serve emerging markets is that their investors and customers tell them not to.”

That was the real secret of The Innovator’s Dilemma, which readers often missed. It was not a book about how to succeed; it was a book about how not to fail. Christensen’s book wasn’t a how-to for start-ups but a counterinsurgency manual for senior managers at stagnating firms. Thirteen years in, Huang felt that Nvidia was at risk of becoming such a firm, and it was as much paranoia as optimism that led him to pursue the mad-science market.

This is an important and underappreciated point: there is no shortage of ‘patient capital’ – institutions such as pension funds and university endowments are naturally looking for investments that may only pay off in the long term – but there is a shortage of patient individuals working in the finance sector, an industry remunerated almost entirely by transactions. The result is a constant flurry of financial activity engaging senior executives, investment professionals and advisers which rarely adds to, and often detracts from, the effectiveness and success of the underlying business. The financial pressures that motivated strategy at Merck and Valeant not only damaged the standing of the businesses and their products but also diminished the returns to their shareholders in the long run. In later chapters I will show that these are far from exceptional cases. The history of pharmaceuticals illustrates much that is right and wrong in the relationship between business and society. I have described four problem areas: the motivation and standards of behaviour of leaders of the industry; the interface between business and finance; the difficulty of constructing a regulatory regime that is relevant and effective; and the sometimes too tenuous relationships between prices, costs and values. None of these issues is unique to the pharmaceutical sector: similar questions arise in every kind of business, and the answers are necessarily specific to industry, time and place. But in this book – and another that will follow – I will illustrate principles and directions of travel.

PART 5: How It All Worked Out

“It is not a coincidence that the emphasis on financial metrics in business occurred at the same time as explosive growth in the size and remuneration of the financial sector. There were useful innovations, such as the emergence of venture capital as a means of financing start-up businesses. But the financial sector is primarily rewarded by fees from facilitating

transactions, not for the consequences of these transactions. Corporate executives engaged in a frenzy of dealmaking, buying and selling existing businesses; incentive plans encouraged actions that generated immediate revenues or cost savings, mostly with unmeasured consequences for the business in the long run. The result was the destruction of many of the great businesses which an earlier generation of less well-rewarded managers had created.