Most great companies are formed to meet the goals and express the values of their founders, which is not always the same as maximizing shareholder wealth. For them, profit is simply a strategic necessity rather than the supreme end point.

This may be a jolting concept, we realize. But we’re certainly not the only management writers who have come to the same conclusion. Peter F. Drucker, in his classic text, Management: Task, Responsibilities, Practices, reached the same conclusion years ago:

Business cannot be defined or explained in terms of profit... The concept of profit maximization is, in fact, meaningless... The first test of any business is not the maximization of profit, but the achievement of sufficient profit to cover the risks of economic activity.

Reverse-engineering strategic options:

(Lafley and Martin, “Playing to Win”, p.187) “1. Frame the Choice

As a general rule, an issue—for example, declining sales or technology change in the industry—can’t be resolved until it is framed as a choice. Until a real choice (e.g., should the company go in this direction or that one?) is articulated, team members can’t understand cognitively or feel emotionally the consequences of the different ways to resolve the issue. A team could talk endlessly about declining sales, making no progress toward solving the problem...

With Olay, framing the choice was crucial. It made the stakes clear immediately. Rather than agonizing endlessly about what to do with a fading brand, the team framed the choice and provided an impetus to action. The team laid out two possibilities: it could attempt to transform Oil of Olay into a worthy competitor to brands like Lancôme and La Prairie, or it could spend billions of dollars to buy a major existing skin-care brand to compete

instead.” (Lafley and Martin, “Playing to Win”, p.188-189) “2. Generate Strategic Possibilities

Framing the issue as a choice identifies a preliminary set of options for resolving the problem; the next task is to broaden the list of possibilities. The objective in this step is to be inclusive rather than restrictive of the number and diversity of possibilities on the table. Here is the opportunity to encourage creative and more-unexpected strategies. In this

context, a possibility should be expressed as a narrative or scenario, a happy story that describes a positive outcome. That is why we like to call them possibilities rather than options. Characterizing the possibilities as stories helps ensure that they are not seen negatively as unsubstantiated opinions. No one is yet arguing for a possibility; you and your colleagues are simply envisioning a world in which that story makes good sense...

Culling a possibility about which a particular individual feels strongly may well cause that individual to withdraw, perhaps for the rest of the process. So inclusion, rather than exclusion, is the rule at this stage...

In the end, the P&G beauty team focused on five where-to-play and how- to-win possibilities for skin care. One was to largely give up on Oil of Olay and to acquire a major global skin-care brand. A second was to keep Oil of Olay positioned as an entry-priced, mass-market brand, strengthening its appeal to current consumers by leveraging R&D capabilities to improve wrinkle-fighting performance. A third was to take Oil of Olay up- market into the prestige distribution channel as an upscale brand. A fourth was to reinvent Olay totally—as a prestige-like brand that appealed more broadly to younger women (age thirty-five to fifty), but sold in the traditional mass channels with retail partners that would be willing to create a masstige experience with a special display section in the store. A fifth was to extend the Cover Girl brand from cosmetics into skin care.

Applied to geopolitical events, or complex businesses, the methods collapsed. These latter problems are best tackled, not by moral algebra, but obliquely: they involve high-level objectives achieved through adaptation and iteration, with constant rebalancing of incompatible and incommensurable components that are imperfectly known but acquired as the process goes on.

Disruptive technologies, Christensen had observed, often grew out of hobbyist communities. They were developed using “bootlegged resources” in which “off-the-shelf components” were redeployed for something other than their intended purpose. They started out wonky but rapidly improved along attributes of performance that established players ignored.

But even once you had absorbed this lesson, it wasn’t easy to implement. Pursuing niche markets cost profits, making investors question your sanity. This, too, Christensen had foretold: “One of the reasons managers at established firms find it difficult to serve emerging markets is that their investors and customers tell them not to.”

That was the real secret of The Innovator’s Dilemma, which readers often missed. It was not a book about how to succeed; it was a book about how not to fail. Christensen’s book wasn’t a how-to for start-ups but a counterinsurgency manual for senior managers at stagnating firms. Thirteen years in, Huang felt that Nvidia was at risk of becoming such a firm, and it was as much paranoia as optimism that led him to pursue the mad-science market.

One of its signals has been so amplified that it drowns out the others. The ‘profit motive’ isn’t something that can be ascribed to corporations — they don’t have motives. What they have is an imbalance between the two key higher-functions — here-and-now versus there-and-then. They aren’t capable of responding to signals from the long-term planning and intelligence function, because the short-term planning function has to operate under the constraints of the financial market disciplinary system. Either a corporation has a survival condition based on needing to make a monthly interest bill, or there’s an implicit threat from the financial environment that if it fails to behave in a particular way, it will be taken over by an outside entity.

If you take away that pressure, it’s quite likely that the natural equilibrium of corporate decision-making systems will be less hostile to human life. Viable systems fundamentally seek stability, not maximisation.