Such co-evolution— of people and their foodstuffs, of science and technology, of social, political and economic institutions— is the history of economic development.

In business, in politics and in our personal lives, we do not often solve problems directly. The objectives we manage are multiple, incommensurable and partly incompatible. The consequences of what we do depend on responses, both natural and human, that we cannot predict. The systems we try to manage are too complex for us to fully understand. We never have the information about the problem, or the future, we face that we might wish for.

Satisfactory responses in these situations are the result of action, but not the execution of design. These outcomes, achieved obliquely, are the result of iteration and adaptation, experiment and discovery. Re-engineering— ‘tossing aside old systems and starting over’— is called for only when systems are seriously dysfunctional. And in almost all cases. The best means of re-engineering is not ‘going back to the beginning and inventing a better way of doing work’ but trying models that have been successfully tested elsewhere. This is equally true of our personal lives, our corporate organisations and our social and economic structures.

This is an important and underappreciated point: there is no shortage of ‘patient capital’ – institutions such as pension funds and university endowments are naturally looking for investments that may only pay off in the long term – but there is a shortage of patient individuals working in the finance sector, an industry remunerated almost entirely by transactions. The result is a constant flurry of financial activity engaging senior executives, investment professionals and advisers which rarely adds to, and often detracts from, the effectiveness and success of the underlying business. The financial pressures that motivated strategy at Merck and Valeant not only damaged the standing of the businesses and their products but also diminished the returns to their shareholders in the long run. In later chapters I will show that these are far from exceptional cases. The history of pharmaceuticals illustrates much that is right and wrong in the relationship between business and society. I have described four problem areas: the motivation and standards of behaviour of leaders of the industry; the interface between business and finance; the difficulty of constructing a regulatory regime that is relevant and effective; and the sometimes too tenuous relationships between prices, costs and values. None of these issues is unique to the pharmaceutical sector: similar questions arise in every kind of business, and the answers are necessarily specific to industry, time and place. But in this book – and another that will follow – I will illustrate principles and directions of travel.

In my book Foundations of Corporate Success, published in 1993, I was sympathetic to the ‘nexus of contracts’ approach, believing – as I still do – that the essence of the firm was an assembly of relationships among individuals. But I did not then realise, as I now do, that the advocates of this idea visualised these relationships as transactional rather than social. A central argument of the present book is that by excessive emphasis on the transactional nature of business relationships we have undermined not only the relationship between business and society but also the effectiveness of business, even in transactional terms.

PART 6: The Corporation in the 21st Century

24: Combinations and Capabilities

“The modern firm is a community, rather than an office or a factory. It is defined not by its plant and machinery but by its capabilities. The successful business is characterised by the distinctive nature of its collection of capabilities and the match between these capabilities and the needs of its customers – and other stakeholders. The claim that George W. Bush told Tony Blair that ‘the problem with the French is that they don’t have a word for entrepreneur’ is, sadly, apocryphal.

The focus on the firm as a collection of capabilities gives a different and more illuminating perspective for understanding the extraordinary diversity of business organisations and of businesspeople over geographies and over time. The core ideas in this book – collective intelligence, radical uncertainty, disciplined pluralism, relational contracts and the mediating hierarchy – have been extensively developed and discussed by earlier writers, though much of that work has been outside the context of business organisation. The relevance of each to the argument of this book arises from a belief that in the modern world successful commercial relationships are not simply instrumental and transactional; they are social and are embedded in a wider framework of communities and teams. That transactional view was both incorrect and unattractive. This book is written in the hope that a better account of how business and its stakeholders flourish will point the way not just to a better understanding of business but to the better conduct of business itself. In a successor volume I will try to explain some of the implications of that understanding for both business policy and public

Policy.