The nascent industry did not escape the attention of rationalisers and consolidators. Billy Durant took over the Buick company and used it as a base for acquisitions of many competitors and suppliers. In 1909 alone he added the names of Cadillac, Oldsmobile and Pontiac to his stable of brands. Durantâs talents as salesman and dealmaker exceeded his capacity to run a business, and the banks that had financed his acquisition spree took control of the cash-stretched company and sacked Durant.
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By contrast, the problems affecting General Motors in 2008 were created by decades of entropy combined with inertia due to embedded obsolete routines, frozen culture, and chain-link systems. Bankruptcy may not be enough to fix this difficult situation. I expect to see the company fragment further and sell off valuable brand names over the next decade.
Leslie Hannah, an eminent business historian, has shown how the ârationalisationâ of industry, which was favoured by the British Government (represented by the Bank of England), set the stage for the new âcorporate economyâ which would characterise Britain for decades. The 1920s saw the creation by merger of ICI (chemicals), the Distillers Company (Scotch whisky) and Unilever (soap and margarine). A similar wave of mergers in Germany established IG Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke as the dominant chemical and steel producers respectively. (Both these companies were dissolved by the victorious Allies in 1945.)
With the assistance of Bill Knudsen, who could no longer work for the irascible, autocratic Henry Ford, GM overtook its principal rival to become not only Americaâs leading automobile company but the largest manufacturing corporation in the world.
23: The Finance Curse
âBut between 1981, when Welch took control at GE, and 2005, when Lampert took control of Sears, a new approach to business developed. Managers like Sir Denys Henderson and Simon Marks, Alfred Sloan and Owen Young, had seen themselves as public figures with associated responsibilities to a wide range of constituencies. The generation that succeeded them had a narrower conception of their role. A successor generation of corporate executives paid close attention to quarterly reporting and the stock price.
For acquisition, he shared, âWe would look at almost anything that came up within the industry for sale, and we had four factors that drove our decisions. One, we would only buy number one or two share brands in their category. We did not believe we could take a dying brand and turn it around. Two, we wanted to buy businesses that had higher gross margin than out company average, so would help our gross margin. Three, we looked for asset-light companies. We didnât want to buy a company with lots of factories or ones for which weâd have to build new factories. We preferred to bring operations into our own facilities. And four, we went for products that had some sort of advantage versus the competition that we could leverage with our marketing, sales, and operations muscle to make better.â That formula guided the well-measured acquisition of numerous leading brands during his tenure, including Spinbrush, OxiClean, Orajel, Batiste, and Vitafusion. These were businesses that his own business leaders had the expertise to run, and he folded them into Church & Dwightâs existing operations. Focusing on employees with R&D expertise, they kept, on average, only 10 percent of employees, many of whom joined the team at headquarters. âWe doubled the size of the company,â he reported, without adding substantially to the number of employees.