The data suggests that institutional inertia is endemic, and costly. Consider:

• Only 11 percent of the companies that made up the Fortune 500 in 1955 are on the list today

• The average age of a company on the S&P 500 Index has fallen from sixty years in the 1950s to less than twenty years currently

• Between 2010 and 2019, US public companies reported more than $550 billion in restructuring charges, which are typically the product of belated or inept attempts at strategic renewal

By contrast, the problems affecting General Motors in 2008 were created by decades of entropy combined with inertia due to embedded obsolete routines, frozen culture, and chain-link systems. Bankruptcy may not be enough to fix this difficult situation. I expect to see the company fragment further and sell off valuable brand names over the next decade.

The business magazine Fortune published a list of the largest 500 US corporations in 1955 and has continued to do so annually ever since. The subsequent fate of the initial top ten provides a powerful rejoinder to the claim that large businesses acquire a scale that leaves them masters of their environment.

In 2020 the Fortune 500 looks very different. Fortune now includes service businesses, so the two top companies by sales are retailers – as would also have been true in 1955. But the current leaders are retailers that did not exist in 1955: Walmart and Amazon. No fewer than four companies are names that probably mean little to non-US readers – they are intermediaries in the fabulously costly US healthcare system. United Health is an insurer, McKesson and Cencora (previously known as AmerisourceBergen) are distributors of pharmaceutical products and CVS Health is both insurer and retailer.

If you had invested in these household names in the 1990s era of shareholder value, you would have lost all your money in GEC and Sears and most of it in the others. Your least bad bet would have been on ICI, whose shares were acquired in 2007 for about one-third of their price a decade earlier. Both GE and Marks and Spencer subsequently lost more than 80 per cent of their peak value. Almost all financial advisers would have agreed in 1995 that a portfolio that consisted of these stocks was a safe and conservative, if unexciting, choice. And that advice would have been spectacularly wrong.

In every case, the activities that analysts and investment bankers applauded diverted attention from the central issues facing the operating businesses, and this diversion was the source of the long-term decline of the corporation. All of these companies cut costs and raised prices in ways that reduced the long-term attractiveness of the business, as exemplified by Marks & Spencer. They engaged in earnings management, effectively borrowing money from the future to enhance reported profits now. As in GE’s financial services businesses. They adopted accounting practices that accelerated the recognition of profits that might be earned in the future but often were not. As at Enron. They were enthusiastic dealmakers, engaging in activities that excited the investment community but which rarely created value and frequently destroyed it. As exemplified by GE. In each case, the short-term boost to the share price was followed by a lengthy – or, in the case of GEC, abrupt – decline. The leaks from the pipes became a flood. Some companies were able to resist the demands of share-holder value. Notable among these stand-outs were some of the leading producers of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG): corporations such as Proctor and Gamble, Colgate–Palmolive, Coca-Cola, Unilever and Nestlé. The culture of these businesses was and still is dominated by marketing people, for whom responsiveness to the needs of customers is a preoccupation. And that responsiveness is the key to the durability of these companies.