The results of this ambitious exercise were first presented to the Club of Rome in private and then published, in 1972, in a book, The Limits to Growth. The conclusions Meadows and his team reached were very different from Keynes’s utopian dream. They were also not what the Club of Rome, nor anyone else for that matter, wanted to hear.

Aggregating the outcomes of the various scenarios they fed into their mainframes showed unequivocally that if there were no significant changes to historical economic and population growth trends—if business continued as usual—then the world would witness a “sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity” within a century. In other words, their data showed that our continued preoccupation with solving the economic problem was the starkest problem facing humankind and that the likeliest outcome if things continued was catastrophe.

This is known as the “alignment” problem. It’s discussed at length in other excellent books, like Superintelligence, Stuart Russell’s Human Compatible, and Brian Christian’s The Alignment Problem, so I won’t go into it in depth here.

18. Order without design

The evolved complexity that Darwin had observed in nature was also true of economic and social systems. Hayek observed that:

Nobody has yet succeeded in deliberately arranging all the activities that go on in a complex society. If anyone did ever succeed in fully organising such a society, it would no longer make use of many minds, but would be altogether dependent on one mind; it would certainly not be very complex but extremely primitive— and so would soon be the mind whose knowledge and will determined everything.

What this means is that when you have to think about connections between parts, rather than just counting the individual parts of a system, the number of possibilities grows very rapidly; the potential combinations multiply, rather than just adding up. Very quickly, they multiply up to astronomically huge numbers, spelling absolute death to any hope of knowing the entire state of the system.

In fact, knowing only a few of the feedback circuits can be actively misleading, if you rely too greatly on your partial information. It is a sobering thought, for example, that despite employing some of the best and brightest* analysts in the world, the advice given by the US State Department over the last fifty years could comfortably have been outperformed by a parrot that had been trained to repeat the phrase, ‘Don’t start a war.’ The repeated failures of the State Department are not the consequence of ignorance; they are the consequence of having very good and deep — but not total — knowledge of an extremely complicated situation, in which facts outside of that information set turned out to be crucial. Knowing a great deal of detail about a subset of a system has a habit of increasing your confidence in your opinions disproportionately from their reliability.

*The phrase ‘the best and brightest’ is often used by people who don’t know that its original context was ironic. It entered the language as the title of David Halberstam’s book about the policy mistakes of the Vietnam War.

This is how the cybernetic problems of the post-war industrial state have been shaped by economics. There are three major blind spots: the belief in markets as computing fabric, the flattening of time and uncertainty and the commitment to Ricardianism.

The belief in markets as computing fabric is such an obvious source of blind spots as to hardly require explanation. Faith in the power of free markets to solve problems is so great as to support the reverse inference of economists that if something appears to be a market equilibrium, then it must be an optimal solution.