Google Ventures, now known as GV, was an investor. They knew our financials and had always been extremely supportive, so I wasn’t worried about the number. I was worried about which teams we’d work with, what technology we’d share, what products we’d build. Nest wasn’t joining Google for the money—we were joining to accelerate our mission. So it was always mission first, money second.

Together with Google, we went through every single function—marketing, PR, HR, sales, every part of the company. We established where we could create synergies and where we couldn’t, figured out which managers would be assigned to us, how we would do the hiring, which perks people would get, which salaries they could expect, which teams would be working together closely, and how those relationships would be established.

It took a lot of time. In fact I was starting to get a lot of eye rolls. “Really, Tony? You want to get into the details of this now?” Yes, yes, I do. It’s important.

And it was—critically important and usually overlooked.

Most acquisitions are driven and overseen by bankers, and bankers only make the real money if the deal goes through, so they’re motivated to move fast and get paid. They don’t care about getting every detail of what happens to employees right. They don’t really care about cultural fit. Not deeply.

Researchers have identified a cluster of anomalies that corrupt this process and lead to suboptimal allocation decisions. Among the most pernicious …

• DEFEND WHAT’S YOURS. Leaders tend to be territorial about the resources they control and are typically reluctant to share money and talent with other units, even when the returns might be higher.

• THE RICH GET RICHER. The biggest units in a multibusiness company tend to get more than their fair share of capital, not because they offer better returns, but because the leaders of these businesses have more political clout.

• GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD. Executives tend to overinvest in struggling businesses in hopes of turning them around. Research shows that in most cases, returns would have been higher if the money had been invested in less troubled units.

• SHARE THE PAIN. When cash is short, executives tend to cut spending across the board rather than protect high-priority areas.

• IT’S WHO YOU KNOW. Senior leaders with strong internal networks typically win more resources than leaders who are less well connected, irrespective of the merits of the particular business case.

• HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS. Senior executives are less likely to defund or divest a business in which they worked earlier in their career.

• PRETTY IT UP. In competing for funds, business unit leaders have an incentive to inflate the merits of their investment proposals. These distortions are often difficult for corporate-level executives to ferret out.

• MORE OF THE SAME. Funding decisions are often made relative to last year’s budget. Every business or product line gets pretty much what it got the year before, plus or minus a few percentage points.

SEVENTEEN: Money

“Like many firms, Nvidia allowed employees to purchase stock at a discount to market prices. What set Nvidia’s program apart was that employees were allowed to purchase stock at a discount to the lowest price at any point in the last two years. These purchases were capped at a certain dollar amount, but as the stock went vertical, the program basically turned into free money, and those who maxed out their contributions each year made the trade of a lifetime. With the windfall extending deep into middle management, some newer employees expressed concerns that the nouveau-riche veterans were entering a state of “semiretirement.” Executives disputed this characterization. Jeff Fisher, who ran the company’s gaming side, had been among the first thirty employees. “Many of us are financial volunteers at this point,” he said, “but we believe in the mission.”

The lure of developing this revolutionary technology offered purpose beyond what money could buy. This was especially true of the old guard, who’d spent years explaining to baffled peers why they were working for a gaming company and who constantly had to correct the pronunciation of the firm’s name. AI had not been a consideration for these veterans, and they were as surprised to be working on it as anybody. “There was no way me, or anybody else, could have dreamed at the time that this stuff that science fiction writers might come up with has become a reality,” said Jay Puri, Nvidia’s head of sales, who started work at the company in 2005. The value of Puri’s shares exceeded $700 million by 2024, but he felt that the interesting work at Nvidia was only beginning. “Maybe I’m biased, but I think it really is the most important technology company of our time,” he said.

TWENTY: The Most Important Stock on Earth

“Management professors theorized that a chief executive should ideally have between eight and twelve direct reports. Huang now had fifty-five. He had no right-hand man or woman, no majordomo, no second-in-command. Huang also had no designated successor, and as Nvidia grew, its C-suite actually shrank, meaning that there was no scapegoat for mistakes. Board members spoke of his irreplaceability; it was not an exaggeration to suggest that Huang had personally saved the American economy from recession. The US stock market, over the course of Nvidia’s rise, had pulled away from markets in Europe and Asia.

PART 5: How It All Worked Out

“It is not a coincidence that the emphasis on financial metrics in business occurred at the same time as explosive growth in the size and remuneration of the financial sector. There were useful innovations, such as the emergence of venture capital as a means of financing start-up businesses. But the financial sector is primarily rewarded by fees from facilitating

transactions, not for the consequences of these transactions. Corporate executives engaged in a frenzy of dealmaking, buying and selling existing businesses; incentive plans encouraged actions that generated immediate revenues or cost savings, mostly with unmeasured consequences for the business in the long run. The result was the destruction of many of the great businesses which an earlier generation of less well-rewarded managers had created.