Then the 2008 financial crisis happened, followed by a long period of recession and austerity, and suddenly it turned out that the technocratic consensus wasn’t as competent or moderate as it had appeared. Ten to twenty per cent of the electorate suddenly realized that they might have to take an interest in politics after all. So they started paying attention again, and they didn’t have the basic assumptions of the mainstream. All they knew was that the people who used to be in charge seemed to have screwed things up mightily.

The first part of the model is System I, or operations, the bit of the organisation that is involved in making change in the real world. It’s a part of the system that could, in principle, be turned into an independent organisation.

This is how the cybernetic problems of the post-war industrial state have been shaped by economics. There are three major blind spots: the belief in markets as computing fabric, the flattening of time and uncertainty and the commitment to Ricardianism.

The belief in markets as computing fabric is such an obvious source of blind spots as to hardly require explanation. Faith in the power of free markets to solve problems is so great as to support the reverse inference of economists that if something appears to be a market equilibrium, then it must be an optimal solution.

*The publication of Eden Medina’s Cybernetic Revolutionaries, a very good history of the project, has helped in recent years.

There are a number of models, most of them ignored for decades, in which the corporate sector provides a stabilising function, insuring the working class against fluctuations in the business cycle, rather than expecting them to soak up the volatility.

The intriguing thing is that Simon and Galbraith didn’t write polemics to the effect that this was how corporations should behave — they just described what was in front of them at the time. Before Milton Friedman’s essay, lots of people assumed that this was just naturally the way things would tend. Without the Friedman fiction by, without very great re-engineering of the systems of corporate finance, the industrial economy might have just gone on and developed into a technostructure.

Maybe they were right? It would certainly be good if they were, because that might indicate a much easier path to defuse the immediate source of crisis. If the problem with the modern corporation is the result of the capitalist counter-revolution against the managerial class, we just need to change the terms of the battle.