Thus, while those who are very wealthy like to believe that they are worthy of the financial rewards they have accrued, many poorer people don’t want to mess with the dream that they too might achieve such riches if only they work hard enough. For them to concede that perhaps the system was stacked against them—that money had become far better at begetting more money than working long hard shifts—would be tantamount to abandoning their sense of agency and their cherished beliefs that what made their countries different was that anyone who worked hard enough could be whatever they wished to be.

In the age of globalization — an ad hoc, temp-job, fiercely competitive age — hope is not a fiction. Extreme poverty is being alleviated gradually, unevenly, nonetheless significantly. But as capital rushes around the planet and the idea of permanent work becomes anachronistic, the unpredictability of daily life has a way of grinding down individual promise. Ideally, the government eases some of the instability. Too often, weak government intensifies it and proves better at nourishing corruption than human capability.

The effect of corruption I find most underacknowledged is a contraction not of economic possibility but of our moral universe. In my reporting, I am continually struck by the ethical imaginations of young people, even those in circumstances so desperate that selfishness would be an asset.

These two features of technology revolutions—their promise to deliver progress and their tendency instead to reverse it for people out of power, especially the most vulnerable—are perhaps truer than ever for the moment we now find ourselves in with artificial intelligence. Since its conception, the development and use of AI has been propelled by tantalizing dreams of modernity and shaped by a narrow elite with the money and influence to bring forth their conception of the technology. That conception is what has led to the exploding social, labor, and environmental costs that are playing out around the world today, particularly, as we’ll see, in many Global South countries, for which the consequences of their dispossession by historical empires still linger in delayed economic development and weaker political institutions. And yet, just like the South Carolina congressman, Silicon Valley has painted the experiences of those being exploited and harmed by the technology as happier because of it.

Yet despite how much stress and hairpulling Appen caused, Fuentes couldn’t imagine leaving the platform. She was terrified that tasks would stop arriving altogether and she would be forced to move on. Appen had been her savior, the only thing that pulled her through when everything else in her life had threatened to end her. Not only that, the earnings were once so great, she was able to invest in a new laptop and recoup the cost and then some.

When things were good, they were really good. When things were bad, she stayed tethered to the platform with the stubborn faith that it would return her loyalty.

These days Fuentes works on five data-annotation platforms at the same time to make a little more than the minimum wage in Colombia, around $335 a month. Each task pays on average between one and five pennies; she still forces herself to wake up when tasks arrive in the middle of the night. “We are ghosts to society, and I dare say we are cheap, disposable labor for the companies we have served for years without guarantees or protection,” she wrote for her project. Since the Data Workers’ Inquiry, she has continued to speak about these experiences in online talks and webinars in the hopes of applying pressure on companies and policymakers to enforce better worker treatment.