A former managing partner at McKinsey & Company expressed this view when he advised executives to focus their attention on the “2 percent [of employees] who are really going to drive [results.]” “It’s a very small proportion of people,” he argued, “who drive a lot of value.” When pressed, he admitted his assertion had “no regression analysis or analytics behind it.” It was, in other words, an untested assumption or, to be more accurate, a prejudice.

This sort of disdain for the average employee mirrors the hauteur of eighteenth-century aristocrats—and has the same stifling effect on creativity and initiative. Stunted freedom and upside yield stunted commitment and performance.

The implications of this kind of leap to a company’s economic model can be devastating. In IBM’s case it meant the collapse of gross profit margins and the attendant changes we had to engineer to lower our cost structure without compromising our effectiveness.

Yet the hardest part of these decisions was neither the technological nor economic transformations required. It was changing the culture—the mindset and instincts of hundreds of thousands of people who had grown up in an undeniably successful company, but one that had for decades been immune to normal competitive and economic forces.

There are a number of models, most of them ignored for decades, in which the corporate sector provides a stabilising function, insuring the working class against fluctuations in the business cycle, rather than expecting them to soak up the volatility.

The intriguing thing is that Simon and Galbraith didn’t write polemics to the effect that this was how corporations should behave — they just described what was in front of them at the time. Before Milton Friedman’s essay, lots of people assumed that this was just naturally the way things would tend. Without the Friedman fiction by, without very great re-engineering of the systems of corporate finance, the industrial economy might have just gone on and developed into a technostructure.

Maybe they were right? It would certainly be good if they were, because that might indicate a much easier path to defuse the immediate source of crisis. If the problem with the modern corporation is the result of the capitalist counter-revolution against the managerial class, we just need to change the terms of the battle.

For some people in the study, making the economics work proved relatively easy, whereas for others it proved much more difficult. Family wealth served as a significant means to pursue a hedgehog in only six of the 34 lives we studied, whereas in ten of 34 cases people endured at least one significant phase of scarcity while in pursuit of a hedgehog. Yet whether easy or difficult (or somewhere in between), they committed to focus their inner fire in line with their encodings and they figured out how to make the economics work.

All the mythologizing is so unfortunate. It has popularized badly misguided notions about how a CEO can succeed in a job that’s not only crucial to the economic foundations of our society but also so cognitively, emotionally, and physically challenging that nearly a third of those appointed last fewer than three years in the role. The mythmaking has obscured so many important lessons we can learn from observing how CEOs struggle mightily with the changing challenges of the role. And overcome them, not only in the early going but also throughout their tenures.