The extent to which the emerging global economic system was being fed by developments in the southern hemisphere was strikingly evident even before 1914. In 1890, the par value of capital invested in the low-grade Witwatersrand mines stood at £22 million, by 1899 it was up to £75 million, and by 1914 it was £125 million. In 1886, the infant Rand industry produced less than 1 per cent of the world’s gold, by 1898 the figure had sprinted to 27 per cent, and by 1914 a whopping 40 per cent of the world’s supply of the precious metal derived from this astounding, still developing new source.

In the event, and throughout most of the 20th century, the southern African states, and more especially most of the mine owners - whose primary, if not sole, loyalties in terms of culture, lifestyle, wealth creation and choice of domicile upon early retirement lay in the northern hemisphere - did better than hold black wages; they managed, over 50 years, to lower them continuously.

The Chamber of Mines, intent on ensuring favourable balance sheets and dividends for its risk-averse investors spread around the developed world, saw no reason for its having to absorb the cost of running an international rail service that amounted to a third of the overall cost of labour recruitment.

For half a century and more, the men of Sul do Save were robbed of their freedom to choose an employer by the Mozambican and South African governments even before they left the country of their birth; on the Witwatersrand itself they were robbed of the true value of their labour by mine owners intent on reducing wages for the benefit of shareholders in the developed world; and upon their return to the border post leading to their homeland the miners were robbed of the true value of their savings by border officials, train conductors and unscrupulous dealers when they were forced to exchange any holdings in ‘foreign currency’ at fraudulent rates.

Successful bidders for objects whose true value is unknown routinely turn out to have paid too much: they won because they were the most optimistic. When there are few publicly held shares in small companies whose success or failure is hard to predict, these shares are more likely to be held by people who overestimate their value than by people who underestimate it. Most such investments fail, but the losses might, though need not, be offset by occasional spectacular gains. The market value of a security is often a poor guide to the value likely to be created in the business over the long run.