At the same time, Kusin turned to George Tamke, the interim CEO who had led the search for Kusin and became nonexecutive chairman when Kusin came on board. Even though Kusin brought in Connors as an outside confidant, Tamke quickly turned into an inside one.
âEvery single Friday night or Saturday morning - and I donât believe I missed a week until we sold the company - I sent George a three- to six-page, single-spaced update of what I was doing, what I was thinking about, what had been going on in the company. We then spent one to two hours late Saturday afternoon going over it. He thought about what I said, and he offered his adviceâŚ
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At 3M Jim McNerney inherited a team that had overseen the slump in the business that had led to the companyâs hiring the first outside CEO in its history. Many people assumed that McNerney would bring in a group of people from GE, where he had most recently been CEO of the aircraft engines unit. He surprised them all by deciding to play the game with the hand he was dealt. In interview after interview, he reiterated the same message: âIâm trying to reset the performance standards here,â he said. âI think the story of 3M is rejuvenation of a talented group of people rather than replacement of a mediocre group of people. This is taking a good company and making it better.
Lucentâs Schacht offers sound advice for the new CEO in a crisis:
âIf I were a new CEO coming into a new company at a tough time. Iâd have a deal with the board. I would tell them, âIâm going to keep you informed every step of the way. But youâre not my most important problem right now. Youâre asked me to come in and youâve given me a good briefing and I thank you; now please give me a little room. Iâll be back with a status report in two or three weeks, and if something else comes up, weâll be on the phone together. But right now my most important constituent is the internal folks and our customers.
The merit of getting to know prospects to choose a good successor was evident in Charlesâ case. Heâd risen to the top of the heap of candidates through a long and rigorous process during which the board had gotten to know him well. Theyâd been presented with a wealth of information about his accomplishments and leadership talents, and they felt confident he was right for the job. But then he totally whiffed his interview with them by showing up in the manner of a direct report rather than speaking to the directors as a peer. He didnât come across as the authoritative leader they could rely on to be forceful with them or to make the tough calls and bold moves that would take the firm where it needed to go. They were really taken aback, and they began to reconsider an external candidate.
But all that they had learned about Charles over the prior five years ultimately prevailed. Because of the experience they had with him, they agreed when we urged them to give him another chance to present. We gave him feedback and shared what the board had said about his prior performance before them. He took the feedback well and returned very much as the in-command CEO the board wanted to see. This ability to take feedback and adapt gave them even more confidence that he would continue to grow once in the role. Charles was appointed and has had a highly successful tenure.
Rassie didn't do one-on-one meetings with players. Instead weâd turn up to a meeting early in the week and the team would be on the board. Heâd go through it, explaining why such and such a player was starting, why such and such a player wasnât starting and maybe why he would be starting in two weeksâ time. It was an open, honest way of doing things, preferable to explaining his reasoning to individual players behind closed doors, which can breed suspicion.
Rassie was very much the man in charge but he wasnât a dictator. He didnât want an environment where some players felt more important than others, he wanted everyone to feel equal. There was still a slight separation of older and younger guys but the younger guys weren't expected to sit in the corner and be quiet.
The independent directors laid out what they knew: This was not the first time that senior leaders had described Altman in this way. In total, the three of them had heard similar feedback from at least seven people within one to two levels of Altman, inclusive of Sutskever, Murati, and Amodei, who oversaw safety and nonsafety parts of the company. Several had described Altmanâs behaviors as abuse and manipulation; most had highlighted his lack of honesty and their inability to trust what he said. Then there were the myriad other issues that the independent directors themselves had found, including the disempowerment of the nonprofit; Altman not disclosing his legal ownership of the OpenAI Startup Fund; Altman neglecting to mention Microsoftâs DSB breach; Altman trying to force DâAngelo and now apparently Toner off the board.