At 3M Jim McNerney inherited a team that had overseen the slump in the business that had led to the companyâs hiring the first outside CEO in its history. Many people assumed that McNerney would bring in a group of people from GE, where he had most recently been CEO of the aircraft engines unit. He surprised them all by deciding to play the game with the hand he was dealt. In interview after interview, he reiterated the same message: âIâm trying to reset the performance standards here,â he said. âI think the story of 3M is rejuvenation of a talented group of people rather than replacement of a mediocre group of people. This is taking a good company and making it better.
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These reviews focused on very basic, very fundamental questions with the intent of helping the team make better strategic choices. The group would spend three or four hours chewing on the few critical issues together. We had three reasons for the shift in process.
First, we wanted to shift the culture of the organization to one that was more dialogue oriented. Second, we wanted to create a structure in which the business teams could truly benefit from the experience and cross-enterprise perspective of senior leaders. And finally, we wanted to build the strategic-thinking capabilities of P&Gâs executives, asking them to practice thinking through strategic issues with others in real time. P&G executives are great operators in the businesses and the functions. The company needed its leaders to become better strategists because better, more choiceful strategies would enable yet better operations. P&G needed multidimensional leaders who could both make tough strategic calls and lead effective operating teams.
These are all executives who have been trained for years to grow their own businesses and are compensated based on their profitability. Suddenly I was saying to them, essentially, âI want you to pay less attention to the business at which youâve been very successful, and start paying more attention to this other thing. And by the way, you have to work on this new thing along with these other very competitive people from other teams, whose interests donât necessarily line up with yours. And one more thing, it wonât make money for a while.
At the same time, Kusin turned to George Tamke, the interim CEO who had led the search for Kusin and became nonexecutive chairman when Kusin came on board. Even though Kusin brought in Connors as an outside confidant, Tamke quickly turned into an inside one.
âEvery single Friday night or Saturday morning - and I donât believe I missed a week until we sold the company - I sent George a three- to six-page, single-spaced update of what I was doing, what I was thinking about, what had been going on in the company. We then spent one to two hours late Saturday afternoon going over it. He thought about what I said, and he offered his adviceâŚ
At GE, Immelt relies on the board to take the pulse of the company, to gauge whether the business is humming along smoothly or there are glitches that need attention. âI asked each of our directors to visit the GE businesses twice a year,â he says. âYouâre never going to know the intricacies of this company. Thereâs too much mass. But you can get a feel of the culture. So when they go to GE Aircraft Engines or GE Medical Systems, I want them by themselves [without corporate management], so they can make their own assessments - maybe weâre pushing too hard or maybe weâre not pushing hard enough.â
At The Home Depot, all directors were required to visit eighteen stores every year and spend two hours on each visit speaking with employees and customers. When he became CEO in 2000, Bob Nardelli continued that tradition and enhanced it: âI pair two board members with every division president and every functional leader for a full day. I look for their advice and counsel. These are CEOs and experienced men and women in their own right. I took advantage of their experience. Rather than being intimidated by it, I reached out and said, 'You go in and assess, give me your view of the individuals and their staffs.â So the board is helpful.
With every team stretched dangerously thin, managers begged Altman for more head count. There was no shortage of candidates. After ChatGPT, the number of job applicants clamoring to join the rocket ship had rapidly multiplied. But Altman worried about what would happen to company culture and mission alignment if the company scaled up its staff too quickly. He believed firmly in maintaining a small staff and high talent density. âWe are now in a position where itâs tempting to let the organization grow extremely large,â he had written in his 2020 vision memo, in reference to Microsoftâs investment. âWe should try very hard to resist thisâwhat has worked for us so far is being small, focused, high-trust, low-bullshit, and intense.
âThe overhead of too many people and too much bureaucracy can easily kill great ideas or result in sclerosis. Unlike the big-iron engineering projects of the past, we could fulfill our mission with a surprisingly small number of great people.â