Alfred P. Sloan, the former CEO of General Motors, presents a nice contrast. He was leading a group of high-level policy makers who seemed to have reached a consensus. “Gentlemen,” he said, “I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here. . . . Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is all about.”

Herodotus, writing in the fifth century b.c., reported that the ancient Persians used a version of Sloan’s techniques to prevent groupthink. Whenever a group reached a decision while sober, they later reconsidered it while intoxicated.

In chapter 7 I described a spectrum of problems. At one end were those— like nought and crosses— best solved directly; at the other were those— the pursuit of happiness— best achieved obliquely. There is an analogous spectrum of decision-making styles, from direct to oblique.

The direct decision maker perceives a direct connection between intentions and outcomes; the oblique decision maker believes that the intention is neither necessary nor sufficient to secure the outcome. The direct problem solver reviews all possible outcomes; the oblique problem solver assembles all available information; the oblique decision maker recognises the limits of his or her knowledge. The direct decision maker maximises his or her objectives; the oblique decision maker is continuously adaptive. The direct problem solver can always find an explanation for his or her choices; the oblique problem solver sometimes just finds the right answer. The direct decision maker believes that order is the production of a directing mind; the oblique decision maker recognises that order often emerges spontaneously— no one fully grasps it. The direct problem solver insists on consistency, on always treating the same problem in the same way; the oblique problem solver never encounters exactly the same problem twice. The direct decision maker emphasises the importance of rationality of process; the oblique decision maker believes that decision making is inherently subjective and prefers to emphasise good judgment.

As we read a modern account of Roosevelt gently edging his country towards the inevitable war, we wonder constantly today: ‘Why doesn’t he get on with it?’ Roosevelt knew better. His goal could be achieved only if approached obliquely.

Roosevelt, like Lincoln before him, understood that the scope of his authority was inescapably limited by the imprecision of his objectives, the complexity of his environment, the unpredictability of the reactions of others and the open-ended nature of the problems he faced. All these factors mean that even the most powerful men in the world must proceed by choosing opportunistically from a narrow range of options.

Conclusions

21. The practice of obliquity

There is not, and will not be, such a science. Our objectives are typically imprecise and multi-faceted, and change as we work towards them, and properly so. Our decisions depend on the responses of others and on what we anticipate those responses will be. The world is complex, imperfectly known, and our knowledge of it is incomplete, and theses things will remain true however much we learn and however much we analyse it.

We do not solve problems in the way the concept of decision science implies because we can’t. The achievement of the great statesman is not to reach the best decision fastest but to mediate effectively among competing views and values.

In retrospect, the erosion seen in the engineer’s Champlain Towers South inspection seems a clear signal of imminent collapse—but at the time it was undeniably ambiguous. Ambiguous threats are problematic because of the natural human tendency to downplay them. It’s natural, and more pleasant, to assume nothing’s wrong and to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Perhaps you’ve heard of confirmation bias-our tendency to see what we expect, thereby reinforcing an existing belief or prediction by paying attention to confirming data and failing to notice disconfirming data. Becoming more self-aware, as you will see in the next chapter, is one element of learning to notice early warnings—and to actively seeking disconfirming data, just in case. But it’s natural to adopt a wait-and-see attitude instead of getting curious and taking a closer look at some subtle signal of irregularity. The financial industry turned a collective blind eye to the risk of mortgage-backed securities, composed of shaky loans granted to people with neither assets nor income to ensure repayment.