The Unaccountability Machine— Dan Davies

Part 1: The Nature of the Crisis

1.Something’s Up

““Capitalism is disappearing, but Socialism is not replacing it. What is now arising is a new kind of planned, centralised society which will be neither capitalist nor, in any accepted sense of the word, democratic. The rulers of this new society will be the people who effectively control the means of production: that is, business executives, technicians, bureaucrats and soldiers.”

George Orwell, ‘James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution’,1946

Then the 2008 financial crisis happened, followed by a long period of recession and austerity, and suddenly it turned out that the technocratic consensus wasn’t as competent or moderate as it had appeared. Ten to twenty per cent of the electorate suddenly realized that they might have to take an interest in politics after all. So they started paying attention again, and they didn’t have the basic assumptions of the mainstream. All they knew was that the people who used to be in charge seemed to have screwed things up mightily.

Economists end up solving this problem by denying it (a mechanism that Stafford Beer looked at in detail, concluding that ignorance is a kind of information processing system of last resort). Where analysis fails, ideology steps in, and the solution the economists decided on was to fantasise an equivalent system for producers — a profit-maximising firm with an understanding of its market, a style production process and a manageable set of decisions. It ended up going disastrously wrong, but the original intellectual sin may have been the failure to respect the integrity of the black box.

In the years when it looked like things were going well, the central banks developed a view of the world in which the changing structures of global finance weren’t part of their job. They didn’t pay attention to the debt bubble, and they had got rid of the communication channels that might have carried the red-alert warnings up to the highest levels of policy-making. More precisely, they had got rid of the translation systems. There was no shortage of people warning that there was a problem in 2006 and 2007, but none of these warnings was given in a form that could be recognised by the world’s central bank governors as requiring action. A failure to build System 4 and balance its variety against System 3 is itself a failure of System 5 — that’s the function that has the job of balancing ‘here and now’ against ‘there and then’. So, using the viable system model to diagnose the causes of the global financial crisis, we end up with a rather interesting conclusion. Where things went wrong was a matter of philosophy. The central banks had an identity-creating function, but it had failed; it defined their purpose in such a way that they failed to understand that particular kinds of information were relevant to them.

Governments were also subject to the same cognitive pressures of a world that was becoming more complicated, so they also needed solutions to attenuate information.