When we asked Nolan Bushnell to tell us about a time when he lost a game in life, he mentioned his having to sell Atari to Warner for twenty-eight million dollars. It was a loss to him, because he couldn’t move his company into retail consumer sales fast enough. But he made the decision with reason and intuition and went on to build other companies. At the time he visited our class, video games and his old company Atari were riding high with billions in sales. But conditions have changed since then, and so has Bushnell. His name now comes up as a backer of successful new technology.

On June 15, 1971, The Washington Post Company went public at $6.50 per share (adjusted for a subsequent 4-for-1 split). When Kay stepped down as CEO on May 9, 1991, the price was $222, a gain of 3,315 percent. During the same period the Dow advanced from 907 to 2,971, an increase of 227 percent.” Now that I have studied Graham’s life and leadership, my own assessment is that she stands as one of the absolute best examples of a leader who took a company from good to great, with some of the gutsiest business leadership decisions of all time.

Terry Lundgren ran into stiff resistance while executing his strategic plan in the years of his Reinvention stage. As noted earlier, he was appointed CEO of Federated Department Stores in 2003 with the express mandate to make bold moves to expand the business. After just three months at the helm, Lundgren faced a golden opportunity: purchasing the legendary Marshall Field’s chain. The acquisition would take the company a grand leap forward, and he would become the steward of another of the nation’s most beloved retail brands.

But his only competitor in the bidding, the May Company, was fierce. Months of intense and elaborate bidding machinations ensued, and in June 2004, Lundgren got word that Gene Khan, the May CEO, had swung for the fences with an offer one investment banker said “took my breath away.” Lundgren immediately backed out. He vividly remembers the difficult phone calls he had to make to his board. His first major move had failed.

For acquisition, he shared, “We would look at almost anything that came up within the industry for sale, and we had four factors that drove our decisions. One, we would only buy number one or two share brands in their category. We did not believe we could take a dying brand and turn it around. Two, we wanted to buy businesses that had higher gross margin than out company average, so would help our gross margin. Three, we looked for asset-light companies. We didn’t want to buy a company with lots of factories or ones for which we’d have to build new factories. We preferred to bring operations into our own facilities. And four, we went for products that had some sort of advantage versus the competition that we could leverage with our marketing, sales, and operations muscle to make better.” That formula guided the well-measured acquisition of numerous leading brands during his tenure, including Spinbrush, OxiClean, Orajel, Batiste, and Vitafusion. These were businesses that his own business leaders had the expertise to run, and he folded them into Church & Dwight’s existing operations. Focusing on employees with R&D expertise, they kept, on average, only 10 percent of employees, many of whom joined the team at headquarters. “We doubled the size of the company,” he reported, without adding substantially to the number of employees.