Another factor at work here, though, is the status quo bias, a powerful and widespread psychological force in business. The concept was introduced by researchers William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, who showed in studies with many kinds of decision-makers, including managers, that âwhen making an important choice, people are more likely to pick the option that maintains things as they are currently.â When youâre enjoying success, your status quo bias is reinforced, which might be just fine. But given that after five, six, or seven years, market conditions will surely have evolved, it usually won't be fine to stick with the status quo later. When responding to those changes would involve making a substantial alteration to or even reversal of a winning strategy or to operational engineering you have orchestrated, the status quo bias makes recognizing the need for change and making the case for it to your team and board a good deal more challenging.
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Thereâs no algorithm to apply, no flow chart to follow, no equation to run to get a perfect hit rate on the decision to develop or replace. The best executives care deeply about their people, and thatâs why they often wait too long. But they also improve their judgment over time.
Which brings us to a crucial question: How do you know when youâve crossed the demarcation line, when itâs time to make the shift from âdevelopâ to âreplaceâ for a key seat? Iâve come to believe the best approach is to ask considered questions and let those questions guide you to an answer. Iâve distilled years of reflection down to seven questions that I offer here to stimulate your thinking when you face the âdevelop or replaceâ conundrum. To be clear, these arenât a prescription; you might come up with only one concern and decide to replace, or you might come up with six concerns and decide to develop.
- Are you beginning to lose other people by keeping this person in the seat?
The best people want to work with the best people, and if they sense chronic tolerance for mediocre performance in key seats, they might begin to vote with their feet. Worse, if you tolerate high-performing people who behave contrary to your stated core values, the true believers will begin to lose heart and become cynical, and some will leave. Thereâs no better way to destroy a great culture than to retain people in key seats who fail to perform or run roughshod over the companyâs core values. roughshod over the companyâs core values.
- Do you have a values problem, a will problem, or a skills problem?
If someone in a key seat behaves consistently or flagrantly contrary to the core values of the enterprise, the best leaders replace them. If someone passionately embraces the core values of the enterprise and also has the indomitable will to do whatever it takes to master his or her seat, you can be more patient before reaching a decision to replace them in that seat. The hardest call comes with the question of will. Does the person lack (or has the person lost) the will to develop to meet the demands of the seat? If not, can you ignite their will?...
- Whatâs the personâs relationship to the window and the mirror?
The right people in key seats display window-and-mirror maturity. When things go well, the right people point out the window, giving credit to factors other than themselves; they shine a light on other people who contributed to the success and take little credit themselves. And when things go awry, they donât blame circumstances or other people for setbacks and failures; they point in the mirror and say, âI am responsible.â People who look in the mirrorâwho always ask, âWhat could I have done better? What did I miss?ââwill grow. People who always point out the window to explain away problems or affix blame elsewhere will be stunted in their growth.
- Does the person see work as a job or a responsibility?
The right people in key seats understand that they donât have âjobsâ; they have responsibilities. They grasp the difference between their task list and their true responsibilities. A great doctor doesnât merely have the âjobâ of performing procedures but embraces responsibility for the health of the patient⊠Every person in a key seat has a broader responsibility than a task list, and the right people never hide behind âI got the tasks doneâ as an excuse for failing to deliver on the broader responsibility.
- Has your confidence in the person gone up or down in the past year?
Just as a companyâs stock price rises or falls as investors gain or lose confidence in the companyâs growth and performance, confidence in a person also rises or falls based on his or her growth and performance. The critical variable is the trajectory of that confidence over time. When someone says, âGot it!â do you increasingly set your worries aside or do you increasingly feel the need to follow up?â
- Do you have a bus problem or a seat problem?
Sometimes you might have a right person on the bus but in the wrong seat. You might have put the person in a seat misaligned with his or her capabilities or temperament. Or perhapsâand this happens frequently in high-growth companiesâthe demands of a seat might have grown to outstrip the capabilities of the person in that seat.
- How would you feel if the person quit?
If secretly relieved, then you might have already concluded that he or she is a wrong person on the bus. If genuinely distraught, then you might well believe that he or she is still a right person on the bus.
For two out of three CEOs in our database, performance was lower in their years six to ten than it was in years one to five. Some gave up their gains of the first five years altogether. Results may not actually dive into negative territory, but if they do, they vacillate up and down around a mean, which only reinforces the sense that one can let up on the gas.
The danger is exacerbated when boards also become less energetic in pushing for vigorous changes in strategy or operations. As director Ann Hanley shared, âItâs easy to get into incremental mode.â A CEOs internal team may resist a continuous quick pace of change.
Alternating between internal and external demands is only one way CEOs must learn to divide their time and energy. They also have to focus on the urgent here and now and on longer-term plans. In addition, they must be in command of the âhard stuffâ of numbers and devote considerable time to the âsoft stuffâ of people management. Also crucial is striking a balance between taking decisive charge by quickly making some moves and engaging in learning more about the company. All require both/and thinking rather than either/or thinking. As skilled as leaders may have become in this over the course of their careers, the challenges of the Launch stage greatly up the ante on getting the balance right. Carol TomĂ© pulled off this balancing act with aplomb.
Advice on combating the status quo bias by methodically rethinking business assessments and gaining perspective from outside the firm is not new. But the problem is that far too few leaders develop a rigorous and continuous discipline of doing so. And if CEOs donât impose that discipline on themselves, nobody else will.
The imperative to challenge yourself becomes more difficult to achieve the longer you have been doing the job successfully. Nigel Travis said, âBeing a CEO for longer is tougher because you have to find ways to keep improving.â Some CEOs recalled feeling less engaged in this stage, with boredom creeping in. âWhen you get into years six to ten, the intellectual stimulus is less,â one shared. âYou come in with lots of ideas,â another commented, âand then run out of them.â Someone else said, âYears six to ten is a period of time when the luster is off the rose and what was new and exciting is no longer new and exciting.
In general, board engagement in the succession process is limited until the time of the decision, which is usually within a year of the transition. Then, they might rush to judgment based on just one or perhaps two interviews with candidates, people with whom theyâve often had little or no other interactions. So little hands-on knowledge of candidates fuels the numerous cognitive biases in their decision-making. One bias is the preference for simplifying narratives, or relying on stereotypes about what a CEO should look and sound like to privilege candidates who are super confident or have a powerful physical presence or can claim bold, even brash, achievements.
We confronted this bias when we were advising about a succession and recommended the board take a more serious look at a candidate. Theyâd dismissed Alex as not having the needed smarts and being just a solid âdoubles hitterâ rather than the star slugger they were looking for. But our assessments indicated he had the smarts in spades, and as a doubles hitter, he was a real standout. We brought some of his accomplishments that had been underappreciated back to the boardâs attention. We also coached him to project a stronger image, including sprucing up his attire. The combination did the trick, and the board selected Alex, who went on to achieve a great deal of success in an eight-year tenure.