FOUR: Thirty Days
âWhen David Kirk arrived at Nvidiaâs offices for the first time, in 1996, he could see at once that the company was doomed. Kirk was a graphics expert who consulted throughout the Valley, which was like being a connoisseur of failure. He had watched a great many start-ups falter, including his own, and Nvidia exhibited all of the symptoms of a company hurtling toward insolvency. The employees looked haggard and demoralized, the quirky product didnât fit with the market, and the supposedly chummy founders were now deadlocked in a âtechnical discussionâ that was obviously more than just a discussion and obviously about more than just technology.
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After a few weeks programming the emulator, Kirk realized he had a second, tacit role at Nvidia: curbing the technical ambitions of cofounder Curtis Priem. Kirk had invented the quadratic-mapping technique used in the NV1, but when he arrived at Nvidia, he advised the company to abandon it. âIt was just an idea I had,â Kirk said. âI have lots of ideas.â But this only made Priem promote quadratic mapping more aggressively. Priem was a purist who dismissed technical compromises as spineless concessions to the money guys. âThe way Curtis thinks is for the end point,â Malachowsky said. âBut he doesnât really have it in his makeup to, like, stay in business.â
Kirk soon realized that the abstruse question of whether or not to use quadratic mapping was a proxy for the more interesting question of who was actually in charge at Nvidia.
FIVE: Going Parallel
âKirk and Huang each combined a commanding breadth of technical expertise with a talent for low cunning. As Nvidia succeeded, many of the other graphics start-ups failed. Huang, sensing opportunity, created a master list of competitors on the whiteboard in his office. Then, in consultation with Kirk, he identified the two or three best engineers at each company and began strategizing on how to poach them.
Kirk recalled showing off the Riva 128 to a competitor at a trade show. When the engineer saw what it could do, he gave up on the spot. âI hired him within a few daysâand that killed that company, right?â Kirk said. âBecause, you know, I removed its brain.â Kirk, mild and professorial, had a predatorâs instincts. âWe had all the geniuses from all the other start-ups, and as we were successful in overtaking more and more of these little companies, the remaining companies had a harder and harder time staying alive.
Of more than a hundred former and current Nvidia employees I spoke with for this book, almost all had a tender story about Huang to relate. One employeeâthe same one whom Huang had humiliated in front of dozens of people, asking for a full refund of his salaryâtold me that when he was later diagnosed with a serious medical issue, Huang offered to pay in full, out of pocket, for his treatment. When Ben Garlick decided to leave Nvidia for a start-up, he was startled to receive an impassioned, personal plea from Huang to stay.
By 2012, the situation was becoming dire. Nvidiaâs stock price had not appreciated in more than a decade, and although revenues and employment at the company had grown considerably, profits remained flat. Huang was bringing supercomputing to the masses, but the masses didnât want it.
Two fringe strains of computer science, starved of investment, hatedâno, detestedâby industry and researchers alike had somehow unified to form a thriving, sprawling entity now careering toward sentience. âI just thought, there is no way that Nvidia is this lucky,â Aarts said. âThereâs no way that deep learning just fits this perfectly because Nvidia has never put any effort into it!â
Huang called it âluck, founded by vision.â
For Dally, it was Huangâs tireless work ethic that made Nvidia succeed. Even Dally, who left no spare second in his day, could not quite believe the superhuman efforts of his boss. âThe rest of us are just here to reduce the bandwidth demands on Jensen,â Dally said. âI mean, when does he sleep?â Diercks agreed: âHis hobbies are work, email, and work.â
Plenty of people worked long hours, though. Jens Horstmann attributed Huangâs success to his adaptability. âIâve often asked myself, how is it that we started in the same cubicle, you know, with a similar IQ, both working equally hard,â Horstmann said. âHow is it that this person not only built this amazing company, but also a network around him of people thatâthat would just die for him if needed?â Huang, Horstmann believed, had changed himself many times. He recalled Huang at LSI, pushing the simulation software to its outer limits. âNow, heâs still doing the same thing, but what heâs engineering is himself. He was not born as a great CEO; he was not destined to be one. He transformed himself into one, just by abstracting! Just by problem-solving the inputs and outputs of what a good CEO should be.